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Abstract 
Location efficient mortgages (LEM) programs are an increasingly popular approach to combating 
urban sprawl.  LEMs allow families who want to live in densely-populated, transit-rich communities to 
obtain larger mortgages with smaller downpayments than traditional underwriting guidelines allow.  
LEMs are premised on the proposition that homeowners in such “location efficient” areas can safely be 
allowed to breach underwriting guidelines designed to prevent mortgage default because they have lower 
than average automobile-related transportation expenses and more income available for mortgage 
payments.  This paper employs records of over 8,000 FHA-insured mortgages matched with data on 
various measures of location efficiency to test this proposition.  Our results suggest that it does not hold 
and that LEMs—like other low-downpayment mortgage programs—will raise mortgage default rates.  
This cost must be weighed against any potential anti-sprawl benefits LEMs may have.  
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Location Efficient Mortgages: Is the Rationale Sound? 
Allen Blackman∗  and Alan Krupnick 
 
1. Introduction1 
Recent polls indicate that urban sprawl is now Americans’ top local concern, edging out 
traditional issues such as crime and jobs (Pew Center, 2000).  As apprehension about sprawl and 
attendant problems of traffic congestion, inadequate infrastructure and auto emissions has grown, 
policy makers have responded with a host of purported remedies (Eggen, 1998).  The location 
efficient mortgage (LEM) is among the most interesting.  LEMs allow families who want to live 
in densely-populated, transit-rich communities to obtain larger mortgages with smaller down 
payments than traditional underwriting guidelines allow.  Advocates claim LEMs will curb 
sprawl by making homes in “location efficient” communities more affordable to low- and 
moderate-income borrowers who would ordinarily be forced to live in less-expensive suburbs or 
exurbs.  Moreover, they claim that even though LEMs breach underwriting guidelines designed 
to prevent mortgage default, they will not raise default rates because families living in location 
efficient areas have lower than average automobile-related transportation expenses and more 
income available for mortgage payments.  
Compared to conventional anti-sprawl policies such as altering local zoning codes, 
providing government funding for developing abandoned inner-city sites, and linking federal 
highway dollars to land use goals, LEMs have a number of attractive features.  While zoning 
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codes involve some measure of government fiat, LEMs simply create economic incentives for 
desired land use behavior but leave the ultimate decisions in the hands of the private sector.  
Also, if LEMs work as advertised and do not raise mortgage default costs, they will require 
virtually no additional expenditures by either the public or private sector. 
LEMs appear to be well on their way to achieving widespread acceptance.  Several 
federal agencies have funded the development of this new policy and LEMs have figured 
prominently in national anti-sprawl and climate change initiatives.2  In the summer of 1999, 
Fannie Mae, the nation’s largest secondary mortgage institution, launched a $100 million pilot 
project making LEMs available in several large metropolitan areas including Chicago, Los 
Angeles, Portland, San Francisco and Seattle.  This initiative has been well-received in the 
national and local media (Allen, 1998; Wollert, 1999).  LEMs programs are under active 
discussion in several other cities (Rimer, 1999; Orlando Sentinel, 1999). 
But will LEMs work as advertised?  Ultimately, the effectiveness of LEMs in slowing 
sprawl will depend on their ability to redirect new development away from fringe areas to 
location efficient areas.  But even if LEMs do this, their viability as a policy instrument is 
questionable if they significantly raise default rates.  If this happens, secondary mortgage 
institutions will be less likely to embrace LEMs, and primary mortgage lenders will be less likely 
to promote them.  According to Avery et al. (1996), even relatively small increases in default 
rates can make a mortgage programs targeted to low- and moderate-income borrowers 
unprofitable (641).   
Since LEMs have only recently been introduced, there are no empirical studies to provide 
guidance on their likely effect on default rates.  LEMs have only just begun to receive attention 
in the academic literature.  Danielsen, Lang and Fulton (1999) contains a general discussion of 
LEMs that effectively endorses the notion that they will not affect default rates.  According to 
the authors, [LEMs] recognize that home buyers who need only one car actually do have greater 
financial capacity, thus acknowledging that not all houses are alike even if they are 
“comparable” in traditional real estate appraisal terms.  The Natural Resources Defense Council 
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found that significant savings accrue from living in higher density neighborhoods that feature 
public transit and pedestrian access to everyday services (Benfield, Raimi and Chen, 1999).  
Mortgage markets should consider these savings when calculating loan risk. (533)   
In a reply to this article, Easterbrook (1999) argues that LEMs are not likely to generate 
significant new demand for houses in location efficient areas, but does not take up the issue of 
whether LEMs will affect mortgage default.   
In this paper, we present the results of an empirical test designed to assess the proposition 
that LEMs will not exacerbate mortgage default.  Since repayment histories for LEMs will not be 
available for several years, we use an indirect test based on the following logic.  If it is true, as 
LEMs advocates claim, that homeowners in location efficient areas can safely be allowed to 
violate traditional underwriting guidelines because they have below-average transportation 
expenses and more funds available for mortgage payments, then historical records of repayment 
on conventional mortgages should show that on average, borrowers in location efficient areas 
have lower default rates than similar borrowers with similar mortgages in other areas.  In other 
words, there should be a statistically significant negative correlation between the location 
efficiency of a home and the probability of mortgage default, all other things equal.  A finding 
that no such relationship exists would suggest that allowing borrowers who live in location 
efficient areas to breach conventional underwriting guidelines would have precisely the same 
impact as allowing randomly selected borrowers to breach these guidelines:  It would raise 
default rates.      
To test for a relationship between location efficiency and mortgage default, we use 
records of over 8,000 Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured mortgages originated in 
Chicago between 1988 and 1992 matched with census tract-level data on location efficiency used 
by lenders issuing LEMs.  Regression analysis indicates that all other things equal, there is not a 
statistically significant relationship between the probability of mortgage default and any of a 
number of different measures of location efficiency.  Although our analysis is certainly not 
conclusive—it only indirectly tests the proposition that LEMs will not raise default rates, and it 
is based on sample of mortgage records that is limited both geographically and temporally—we 
believe our findings cast considerable doubt on the notion that LEMs will be a virtually costless 
anti-sprawl policy. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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There is some precedent for our analysis in the empirical literature on the determinants of 
mortgage default.  A number of papers in this literature have found an association between the 
probability of default and location, all other things equal, although none of them have looked 
specifically at the relationship between the probability of default and location efficiency.  In an 
analysis of thousands of loans originated in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, von Fustenberg and Green 
(1974) found that suburban location reduced delinquency risks by as much as 47 percent 
compared with urban location all other things equal, a finding that appears to contradict the 
arguments of LEMs advocates.  However, Mills and Lubele (1994) concluded that residential 
mortgages on single-family properties located in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods 
outperformed those in a locationally diverse national sample.  More recently, using a much larger 
data set, Van Order and Zorn (1996) found that neighborhood income was generally negatively 
related to default all other things equal.   
While the impact of locational characteristics on the probability of default remains 
something of an open question in the literature, the impact of loan-to-value ratios on the 
probability of default is not.  Empirical studies consistently have found that higher loan-to-value 
ratios (smaller downpayments) significantly increase the probability of default.  For example, 
empirical analysis of FHA and Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) insured mortgages shows 
that loan-to-value ratio at the time the loan is originated is the most important predictor of 
default.  When loan-to-value ratios are raised from 90 to 97 percent—the maximum ratio for 
LEMs—default rates increase sevenfold (Quercia and Stegman, 1992, 349; see also Deng et al., 
1996; Van Order and Zorn, 1996; Berkovec et al., 1998).  Higher than standard debt-to-income 
and housing-expense-to-income ratios have also been shown to exacerbate default risk (Quercia 
and Stegman, 1992, 350; Avery et al., 1996, 644)   
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section provides further 
background on LEMs.  The third section describes our regression model and data.  The fourth 
section presents our econometric results.  The fifth section sums up and concludes. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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2. Background 
In 1995, three nonprofit organizations—the Center for Neighborhood Technology in 
Chicago, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) in San Francisco, and the Surface 
Transportation Policy Project in Washington, DC—formed a consortium to develop LEMs.3  The 
consortium was funded by the Department of Transportation, the Department of Energy, the 
Environmental Protection Agency and several private foundations.   
After several years of refinement, LEMs were unveiled in 1998.  They are 15- to 30-year 
fixed interest mortgages for mortgages of up to $240,000 on one-unit, owner-occupied houses 
and condominiums.  They allow borrowers to “stretch” traditional lending guidelines that 
mandate a minimum downpayment in the range of 5 to 20 percent of the appraised property 
value (or equivalently, a maximum loan-to-value ratio of 80 to 95 percent), a maximum housing-
expense-to-income ratio of 28 percent, and a maximum debt-to-income ratio of 36 percent.  
LEMs allow downpayments as low as 3 percent (or equivalently, loan-to-value ratios as high as 
97percent), housing-expense-to-income ratios as high as 35 percent, and debt-to-income ratios as 
high as 45 percent.4 
The actual terms of individual LEMs are determined by computer models developed by 
the LEMs consortium for each city in which the new loans are to made.  For any given property 
in one of these cities, the model assess the location efficiency of the property and then estimates 
the dollar savings in automobile-related expenditures a prospective owner would enjoy.  This 
“location efficiency value” (LEV) is added to a mortgage applicant’s income in calculating the 
housing-expense-to-income and debt-to-income ratios that determine the maximum mortgage 
                                                 
3 The inspiration for LEMs was an NRDC-sponsored econometric study that found a strong negative relationship 
between both vehicle miles traveled and auto ownership on one hand, and residential density (the number of 
dwelling units per square mile) and transit accessibility on the other hand (Holtzclaw, 1994).  The study was seen as 
evidence that: (i) vehicle miles traveled along with auto emissions and traffic congestion could be reduced by 
creating incentives for people to live in high-density, transit rich areas, and (ii) families applying for mortgages in 
location efficient areas could safely be given larger loans than traditional underwriting guidelines allow since they 
would have lower than average automobile related transportation expenses.  Note that Holtzclaw’s findings are 
controversial.  Schimek (1996) suggests that vehicle miles traveled are not very responsive to changes in residential 
density except at very high densities (approaching 10,000 persons per square mile). 
4 LEMs are a new and still-evolving mortgage product.  There has been some discussion of modifying them by, for 
example, requiring borrowers to purchase a long term transit pass.  Our paper tests whether the bare-bones idea that 
underpins LEMs—location efficiency reduces default risk—stands on its own. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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amount.  The end result is that borrowers who apply for loans on homes in location efficient 
areas can “get a larger mortgage than possible with any other product now on the market” (CNT, 
2000), presumably enabling them to afford such homes.   
The promotional literature used by the LEM consortium includes the following 
hypothetical example.  A loan applicant with an income of $2,100 per month, no long term debt 
and $6,000 in funds for a downpayment wishes to purchase a $105,000 home in a location 
efficient area.  The conventional 28 percent limit on the housing-expense-to income ratio implies 
that the maximum amount the loan applicant can borrow is $76,058, too little to afford the home.  
But according to the LEM computer model, living in this particular home would enable to the 
borrower to save $653 per month in automobile-related transportation costs relative to living in a 
location inefficient home.  Adding this savings to the applicant’s monthly income in calculating 
the housing-expense-to-income ratio enables the borrower to get a $115,611 mortgage, more 
than sufficient to purchase the home.   
It is important to note that because LEMs enable borrowers with a fixed amount of funds 
available for a downpayment to obtain larger loans, they have the effect of reducing the 
downpayment as a percentage of the appraised property value (that is, raising the loan-to-value 
ratio).  For example, in the hypothetical case described above, the downpayment is 8 percent 
without a LEM and 5 percent with the LEM.    
The LEMs consortium’s computer models calculate LEVs in three steps (see the 
Appendix for a detailed description).  First, they use an econometric model (Holtzclaw, 1994) to 
predict both vehicle miles traveled and number of autos owned for a given residence using six 
independent variables.  Two of these independent variables—household income and number of 
persons in the household—are specific to the loan applicant.  The remaining four independent 
variables—households per residential acre, households per total acre, “pedestrian factor,” and 
“transit access”—relate to the census tract in which the home is located.  Second, given 
econometrically estimated vehicle miles traveled and auto ownership, auto expenses are 
calculated using Federal Highway Administration figures on the costs of owning and operating 
automobiles (Federal Highway Administration, 1992).  Finally, automobile expenses for the 
applicant’s household are subtracted from the “base case”—automobile expenses for a household 
of similar size and wealth in a neighborhood with relatively low density, poor transit access, and 
low pedestrian friendliness. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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3.  Econometric Model and Data 
Econometric models of mortgage default fall into two categories: those that adopt the 
lender’s perspective and those that adopt the borrower’s perspective (Quercia and Stegman, 
1992).  Both types of models use similar independent variables to explain the probability of 
default (for example, the loan-to-value ratio, the market value of the property, and the borrower’s 
income).  However, the former only use information the lender has at the time the loan is 
originated while the latter use information available at the time of origination and in every 
payment period afterwards.  Not surprisingly, borrower’s perspective models more accurately 
predict default and also better reflect how default decisions are really made.5  Nevertheless, we 
employ a lender’s perspective model.  This is appropriate because the purpose of our paper is not 
to understand the role location efficiency plays in the borrower’s decision to default.  Rather, it is 
to test whether a specific piece of information that the lender has at the time the loan is 
originated—the location efficiency of the property—has value as a predictor of default and 
should be taken into account in deciding whether to allow the borrower to breach traditional 
lending guidelines. 
We use a simple logit regression to test for a relationship between the probability of 
default and various measures of location efficiency holding constant as many mortgage, 
property, and borrower characteristics as our data permits.  For each annual cohort of mortgages 









=    
 
where,  
                                                 
5 From a theoretical perspective, a consensus now exists that mortgage default is best viewed as a put option, that is, 
an option to “sell” the home to the lender for the value of the mortgage at the beginning of each payment period.  
Whether or not the borrower exercises this option in each period depends on contemporaneous information 
including: the market value of the house, the market value of the mortgage, the transactions costs associated with 
default, expectations abut future market conditions which affect the value of waiting to exercise the option, and 
“triggering events” like unemployment, illness and divorce (Avery, et al, 1996, 623; Quercia and Stegman, 1992). Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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P is the probability of default,  
X is a vector of locational characteristics, 
ββββ is a vector of parameters, 
Z is a vector mortgage, property and borrower characteristics, and 
γγγγ is a vector of parameters. 
 
We run separate regressions for each annual cohort to control for differences in the time 
period during which default can be observed.  One complication is that some of the locational 
characteristics included in the vector X may be correlated with each other.  To control for 
collinearity, we report regression results for a number of different specifications of the model. 
Our data consists of records of over 8,000 FHA-insured mortgages originated in the 
greater Chicago metropolitan area in 1988, 1989, 1991 and 1992, matched with census tract-level 
information on location efficiency in this area (we do not use 1990 data because we only have 
190 mortgage records from that year).  Data availability dictated our decision to focus on a single 
city.  At the time we conducted our analysis, the LEMs consortium had only tabulated location 
efficiency data for Chicago.  In addition, matching mortgage data with location efficiency data 
proved to be quite resource intensive.  Spatially, the data is heterogeneous:  The mortgage 
properties are situated in over one thousand different census tracts in urban and suburban 
Chicago. 
The mortgage records—including detailed information on borrower, mortgage, and 
property characteristics—were obtained from the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development.  The data on location efficiency was developed by the LEMs consortium and 
comes from a variety of sources: the 1990 census, the Chicago Metropolitan Planning 
Organization, and the Chicago Transit Authority.  Detailed information on the location efficiency 
variables is provided in the Appendix.  Table 1 provides definitions of the variables that we use 
in the regression analysis and Table 2 provides summary statistics.   Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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Table 1.  Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependant   
DEFAULT  1 if borrower defaults, 0 otherwise 
Location   
HH_DENS  Households per residential acre in census tract 
LEV Location  efficiency  value 
PED_FACT  Pedestrian friendliness factor in census tract 
RAW_DENS  Households per total acre in census tract 
URBAN  1 if property is in an urban area, 0 otherwise 
ZONAL_TR  Zonal transit access in census tract 
Mortgage   
DTI Debt-to-income  ratio 
HEI Housing-expense-to-income  ratio 
LTV Loan-to-value  ratio 
Property   
CONDO  1 if property is a condominium, 0 otherwise 
HVAL  Appraised value of the property at time of purchase 
HVAL2 HVAL  squared 
Borrower   
AGE Borrower  age 
ASI_AMIN  1 if Asian or American Indian borrower, 0 otherwise 
BLACK  1 if black borrower, 0 otherwise 
DEPNUM  Number of dependents (excluding borrower and co-borrower) 
FIRSTBUY  1 if borrower is a first-time home buyer, 0 otherwise 
HISPANIC  1 if Hispanic borrower, 0 otherwise 
INCOME  Total annual effective family income 
INCOME2 Income  squared 
LQASS  Liquid assets available at closing 
LQASS2 Liquid  assets  squared 
NOCBINC  1 if no coborrower or coborrower income is zero, 0 otherwise 
REPEATBUY  1 if borrower is not a first-time home buyer, 0 otherwise 
SINGLEF  1 if borrower is a female and there is no co-borrower, 0 otherwise 
SINGLEM  1 if borrower is a male and there is no co-borrower, 0 otherwise 
WHITE  1 if white borrower, 0 otherwise Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics  
Variables 1988  1989  1991  1992  All 
  n = 2337  n =1683  n =898  n =3225  n =8143 
  mean  s.d.   mean  s.d.   mean  s.d.   mean  s.d.   mean  s.d.  
Dependant              
DEFAULT  0.10 0.31 0.09 0.28 0.08 0.26 0.06  0.23  0.08  0.27 
Location               
HH_DENS  11.17 54.06  9.34 19.21 13.22 72.36 11.59  49.38  11.18  49.58 
LEV  114.15 94.26  109.69 92.81  113.65 94.67  114.20  98.99  113.19  95.91 
PED_FACT  0.84 0.45 0.81 0.44 0.82 0.44 0.81  0.44  0.82  0.44 
RAW_DENS  5.19 6.95 5.00 7.05 5.07 7.05 5.34  7.51  5.20  7.21 
URBAN  0.333 0.472 0.308 0.462 0.321 0.467 0.302  0.459  0.314  0.464 
ZONAL_TR  19.97 95.49 16.87 51.71 26.81  159.26 19.87  88.18  20.05  95.13 
Mortgage               
DTI  50.66 8.29  52.00 6.99  34.97 6.35  34.92  6.42  42.97 10.82 
HEI  22.44 6.52  23.82 6.14  23.85 5.47  24.26  5.79  23.60  6.09 
LTV  92.00 6.76  91.78 6.38  92.66 7.55  92.58  7.15  92.26  6.94 
Property               
CONDO  0.12 0.32 0.12 0.33 0.15 0.36 0.15  0.36  0.14  0.34 
HVAL  69.11 20.25 75.70 23.36 81.50 25.79 91.15  26.57  80.57  25.89 
HVAL2  5,186.04 3,086.87 6,275.24 3,842.72 7,306.58 4,796.90 9,014.00  5,021.30  7,161.06  4,576.83 
Borrower               
AGE  33.52 8.97  33.47 9.23  33.51 8.98  33.75  9.37  33.60  9.19 
ASI_AMIN  0.03 0.16 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.14 0.02  0.15  0.02  0.15 
BLACK  0.28 0.45 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.43 0.22  0.41  0.24  0.43 
DEPNUM  1.07 1.26 1.03 1.29 0.97 1.26 1.02  1.31  1.03  1.29 
FIRSTBUY  0.78 0.41 0.80 0.40 0.81 0.39 0.75  0.43  0.78  0.42 
HISPANIC  0.15 0.35 0.16 0.37 0.20 0.40 0.19  0.40  0.17  0.38 
INCOME  39.81 14.40 41.64 14.32 41.87 14.15 44.99 111.31  42.47  70.95 
INCOME2  1,791.67 1,595.62 1,938.40 1,653.89 1,952.42 1,404.65  14,409.35  698,436.40  6,836.90  439,544.50 
LQASS  8.39 9.83 9.39  10.44 9.38  12.19 9.80 11.01  9.27 10.72 
LQASS2  166.48 593.19 196.63 885.48 235.94  1,142.00 216.74  1,013.80  200.28  902.31 
NOCBINC  0.28 0.45 0.28 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.35  0.48  0.31  0.46 
RPEATBUY  0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39 0.25  0.43  0.22  0.42 
SINGLEF  0.12 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.36 0.17  0.37  0.14  0.35 
SINGLEM  0.16 0.37 0.16 0.36 0.20 0.40 0.18  0.38  0.17  0.38 
WHITE  0.55 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.53 0.50 0.56  0.50  0.56  0.50 
 
The data on FHA-insured mortgages are well suited to our analysis for a number of 
reasons.  First, as Berkovec et al. (1998) point out, they are particularly appropriate for analyzing 
the determinates of default since the incidence of default on FHA-insured mortgages is relatively 
high.  The incidence of default in our pooled sample is 8 percent, with higher rates in earlier Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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years and lower rates in later years (Table 2).6  By contrast, the incidence of default in a sample 
of over 400,000 loans originated between 1975 and 1983 and purchased by Freddie Mac is just 2 
percent (Van Order and Zorn, 1996).  Second, underwriting guidelines for FHA-insured loans 
and LEMs are somewhat similar and as a result one would expect the two programs to attract 
somewhat similar pools of borrowers.  Both types of mortgages allow a lower downpayment and 
higher ratios of housing-expense-to-income and debt-to-income than conventional mortgages.  In 
addition, LEMs and FHA-insured mortgages have similar lending limits and target first-time 
homebuyers, among other borrowers.7  Finally, the FHA-insured data are well-suited to our 
analysis because they are extremely rich.  As a result, we are able to control for 18 borrower, 
mortgage, and property characteristics.  
Summary statistics presented in Table 3 foreshadow our regression results.  The table 
presents default rates for two subsamples of mortgages in each annual cohort: those having a 
LEV and a LTV ratio that are above-average—characteristics that make them roughly equivalent 
to LEMs—and those that have an LEV and an LTV ratio that are below-average.8  For each 
annual cohort, the mean default rate for the first subsample is significantly greater than that for 
the second.  For example, for 1988, the LEM proxies have a default rate of 17 percent while 
mortgages with below-average LEV and LTV ratios have a default rate of 3 percent.  This would 
seem to suggest that any desirable effect that greater location efficiency has on default rates is 
swamped by the undesirable effect of higher LTV ratios, so that loans with a high LEV and a 
high LTV ratio will likely raise default rates.  
                                                 
6 The main reason that more recent annual cohorts have lower default rates is simply because there are fewer years 
between the time the loan was originated and the time the data were collected (1997).    
7 FHA debt-to-income (DTI) and housing expense-to-income (HEI) ratios are defined unconventionally:  Income is 
gross income used to calculate conventional lending ratios less federal withholding tax; housing expenses include 
principal, interest, taxes and insurance used to calculate conventional ratios plus expenses for utilities and 
maintenance; and debt payments include expenses for housing, plus any debt that requires at least 12 months of 
payments, revolving debt, city and state income taxes, and Social Security payments.  Given these definitions, the 
FHA HEI limit is 38 percent and the FHA DTI limit is 53 percent.  The LTV limit is 97 percent.  In our sample of 
FHA borrowers, the average HEI ratio is 24 percent, the average DTI ratio is 43 percent, and the average LTV ratio 
is 92 percent. Over three-quarters of the borrowers in our sample are first-time homebuyers.  The maximum FHA 
loan amount in the Chicago primary metropolitan statistical area is $209,000. 
8 We credit an anonymous referee with suggesting this test.   Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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Table 3. Mean default rates by year, LEV and LTV (n) 
  1988* 1989* 1991* 1992* 
Above-average 









      
Below-average  










*Difference in means statistically significant at 1 percent level. 
 
Although interesting, these summary statistics are merely suggestive.  Since LEV and 
LTV ratio are correlated with other determinants of mortgage repayment such as the borrower’s 
liquid assets and number of dependents, the higher default rates on the LEM proxies in Table 3 
may be driven by omitted variables.  For example, it may be that persons living in high-LEV 
areas tend to have more dependents, and as a result default more often.  The regression analysis 
presented in the next section avoids this problem by assessing the independent effects on default 
of a wide range of factors. 
4.  Results 
Table 4 provides results for our four econometric models.  In each model, the dependent 
variable is DEFAULT, a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the borrower defaults and 0 
otherwise.9  Model 1 is intended as a benchmark.  It includes only the control variables—that is, 
the mortgage, property, and borrower characteristics—and excludes the location variables that 
are the focus of our interest.  If we interpret significance in at least two of the four annual cohorts 
as implying that a variable is generally correlated with the probability of default, then our results 
mirror those found in the literature (for example, Berkovec et al., 1998).  With regard to 
mortgage characteristics, the probability of default is higher for mortgages with higher loan-to-
value ratios.  With regard to property characteristics, the probability of default is lower for 
properties with higher appraised property values.  With regard to borrower characteristics, the 
                                                 
9 Our definition of default includes lender foreclosure as well as conveyance of the title to the lender or insurer in 
lieu of foreclosure.  This definition of is commonly used in empirical studies of mortgage default (Quercia and 
Stegman, 1992, 343). Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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probability of default is higher for borrowers who are African American, have more dependents, 
are first time homebuyers, have less liquid assets, and are single males.   
Note that the probability of default is negatively correlated with the debt-to-income ratio 
and is ambiguously correlated with income.  Although counterintuitive, such findings are not 
uncommon (for example, Avery, et al., 1996, 624; Vandell and Thibodeau, 1985, 309).  They 
likely stem from the well-documented “U-shaped” effect of income on the probability of default 
(Deng et al., 1996, 274).  In addition, the first result may stem from debt-to-income ratio 
thresholds written into the lending guidelines (Quercia and Stegman, 1992, 350).10 
Model 2 regresses DEFAULT onto LEV—the transportation cost savings estimated by 
the LEM consortium’s computer model—controlling for 18 mortgage, borrower, and property 
characteristics.  In this model, LEV serves as an index of location efficiency that presumably 
captures residential density, transit access, and pedestrian friendliness.  As Table 4 illustrates, 
LEV is significant in two annual cohorts (1989 and 1992) at the 10 percent level.  However, the 
sign of the coefficient on LEV in both of these years is positive, implying that greater location 
efficiency is correlated with higher rates of mortgage default.  This unexpected sign may arise 
because LEV acts as a proxy for a missing variable that is positively correlated with default.  The 
most likely candidate is urban location.  By definition LEVs are generally higher in urban areas 
than in suburban areas and, as discussed in the introduction, empirical studies typically find that 
the probability of default is higher in urban areas than in suburban areas.  
                                                 
10 We are unable to control for these non-linearities by using a series of dummy variables as in Berkovec et al. 
(1998) because we have too few observations. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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Table 4.  Logit Regression Results Table 4.  Logit Regression Results 
(Dependant Variable = DEFAULT) 
 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2 
  1988 1989 1991 1992 1988 1989 1991 1992 
  (n = 2337)  (n = 1683)  (n = 898)  (n = 3225)  (n = 2337)  (n = 1683)  (n = 898)  (n = 3225) 
Location          
LEV      0.00007  0.00193*      -0.00205  0.00183*     
      (0.073)  (1.779)  (-1.136)  (1.928) 
HHDENS          
P E D _ F A C T           
R A W _ D E N S           
U R B A N           
ZONAL_TR          
          
Mortgage          
DTI  -0.03211***  -0.02175  -0.03953*    -0.00401  -0.03204***  -0.01941  -0.04066*    -0.00215 
HEI  0.02472 0.07596**    0.08953 -0.03464  0.02477 0.07534**    0.08691 -0.03398 
LTV  0.03734**   0.0452*    -0.00955  0.02792*    0.0374**   0.0466*    -0.01094  0.02864*   
          
Property          
CONDO  -0.85981**   -1.15303**   -0.72759  -0.36466  -0.85986**   -1.21797***  -0.71806  -0.42474 
HVAL  -0.00069  -0.05595**   -0.00391  -0.03284*    -0.00071  -0.05233**   -0.00645  -0.0322*   
HVAL2  -0.00007 0.00021  -0.00003 0.00017**    -0.00007 0.00018  -0.00002 0.00017*     
          
Borrower          
AGE  0.0059  0.00836 0.00652 0.00305 0.00583 0.00731 0.00807 0.00153 
ASI_AMIN  0.28535 0.88152 0.69574 0.5552  0.28272 0.92348 0.78928 0.49909 
BLACK  1.50553*** 1.19737*** 1.75441*** 0.96857*** 1.50195*** 1.10681*** 1.87963*** 0.85648*** 
DEPNUM  0.19006*** 0.166**    0.06072  0.21014*** 0.18955*** 0.14815**    0.07713  0.19273*** 
FIRSTBUY  -0.05011  -0.24002  -0.5947*    0.36865*    -0.05097  -0.27609  -0.58212*    0.34435 
HISPANIC  -0.08513 -0.21497 0.2351  0.19418  -0.09071 -0.39273 0.43265  0.00946 
INCOME  -0.03408  0.10108*    0.01769  -0.0295**   -0.03409  0.09476*    0.02667  -0.03048**  
INCOME2  0.00021  -0.00096*    -0.00024  0.000004*    0.00021  -0.0009  -0.00035  0.000005*   
LQASS  -0.1339***  -0.07729*** -0.10949*** -0.03502**    -0.13393*** -0.07813*** -0.11146*** -0.03589**   
LQASS2  0.00174***  0.00054**   0.00069**   0.00028**   0.00174***  0.00054**   0.00069**   0.00029**  
NOCBINC  -0.04847 0.21964  -1.13815**    -0.12258 -0.04767 0.26168  -1.167**    -0.08092 
SINGLEM  0.63898**   0.14916  1.06484**   0.47322*    0.63906**   0.11422  1.06381**   0.47523*   
          
Intercept  -3.6548*    -7.029**   -1.8046  -2.6641  -3.6656*    -7.3448**   -1.5675  -2.8495*   
          
Pseudo  R^2  0.1892 0.1549 0.1585 0.103  0.1892 0.158  0.1612 0.1056 
*  statistically significant at 10 percent level 
** statistically significant at 5 percent level 
*** statistically significant at 1 percent level  Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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Table 4.  Logit Regression Results (continued) 
(Dependant Variable = DEFAULT) 
 
Variable  Model 3  Model 4 
  1988 1989 1991 1992 1988 1989 1991 1992 
  (n = 2337)  (n = 1683)  (n = 898)  (n = 3225)  (n = 2337)  (n = 1683)  (n = 898)  (n = 3225) 
Location          
LEV  -0.0006  0.0016  -0.0026  0.0007      
  (-0.542)  (1.180)  (-1.095)  (0.602)      
HHDENS      0.0006  0.0035  -0.0038  0.0010 
      (0.125)  (0.818)  (-0.276)  (0.355) 
PED_FACT      0.1027  0.4080  0.4923  0.3523 
      (-0.329)  (-0.03)  (-1.287)  (-0.605) 
RAW_DENS       -0.0074  -0.0007  -0.0794  -0.0114 
      (0.401)  (1.294)  (0.88)  (1.206) 
URBAN  0.1992 0.0854 0.1459 0.3106 0.1469 0.0649 0.0064 0.3320 
 (0.958)  (0.324) (0.363) (1.359) (0.736)  (0.254) (0.016) (1.498) 
ZONAL_TR      -0.0011  -0.0003  0.0002  -0.0009 
      (-0.538)  (-0.137)  (0.054)  (-0.511) 
          
Mortgage          
DTI  -0.0323***  -0.0193 -0.0403*  -0.0027 -0.0323***  -0.0191 -0.0400*  -0.0028 
HEI  0.0256 0.0760**  0.0857 -0.0347  0.0261 0.0764**  0.0962 -0.0324 
LTV  0.0377**  0.0466* -0.0111 0.0304* 0.0375**  0.0462* -0.0120 0.0309* 
          
Property          
CONDO  -0.8140** -1.1974***  -0.6844  -0.3629  -0.7514** -1.0807** -0.4993  -0.1949 
HVAL  0.0001  -0.0523**  -0.0054 -0.0304*  -0.0003 -0.0539**  -0.0070 -0.0301* 
HVAL2 -0.0001  0.0002 0.0000 0.0002*  -0.0001  0.0002 0.0000 0.0002* 
          
Borrower          
AGE  0.0053 0.0072 0.0075 0.0010 0.0056 0.0074 0.0082 0.0005 
ASI_AMIN  0.2921 0.9262 0.7790 0.5198 0.2697 0.9685*  0.7229 0.5426 
BLACK  1.4905*** 1.0965*** 1.8749*** 0.8337*** 1.4572*** 1.0695*** 1.7527*** 0.7928*** 
DEPNUM  0.1968*** 0.1507**  0.0827  0.2031*** 0.1900*** 0.1650**  0.0603  0.2066*** 
FIRSTBUY  -0.0725 -0.2802 -0.5788**  0.3437  -0.0671 -0.2603 -0.5793*  0.3375 
HISPANIC  -0.1072 -0.4024 0.4337  -0.0090 -0.1392 -0.4290 0.3573  -0.0328 
INCOME  -0.0326 0.0957* 0.0290  -0.0295**  -0.0328 0.1042* 0.0286  -0.0269* 
INCOME2  0.0002  -0.0009 -0.0004 0.0000* 0.0002  -0.0010*  -0.0003 0.0000 
LQASS  -0.1341*** -0.0782*** -0.1120*** -0.0363**  -0.1339*** -0.0799*** -0.1082*** -0.0360** 
LQASS2  0.0017***  0.0005** 0.0007** 0.0003** 0.0017***  0.0006** 0.0007** 0.0003** 
NOCBINC  -0.0586 0.2621  -1.1676**  -0.0930 -0.0467 0.2740  -1.1086**  -0.0949 
SINGLEM  0.6389** 0.1077  1.0618** 0.4757*  0.6356** 0.0782  1.0293** 0.4784** 
          
Intercept  -3.7437** -7.3844** -1.6259  -3.0792*  -3.8141** -7.7401***  -1.9706  -3.4333** 
          
Pseudo  R^2  0.1898 0.1581 0.1615 0.1070 0.1900 0.1595 0.1645 0.1079 
*  statistically significant at 10 percent level 
** statistically significant at 5 percent level 
*** statistically significant at 1 percent level  
 Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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To test the hypothesis that LEV proxies for urban location, in Model 3 we add a new 
control variable called URBAN, a dummy that takes the value of one if the property is located in 
an urban area and zero otherwise (this variable is included in the FHA data set).  Now, LEV is no 
longer significant in any of the four annual cohorts.  This strongly suggests that the reason LEV 
is positively correlated with default in Model 2 is its correlation with urban location.  Correlation 
coefficients support this hypothesis.  The simple correlation coefficient between LEV and 
URBAN is 0.66.   
Because LEV and URBAN are strongly correlated, there is a possibility that the results in 
Model 3 are affected by multicollinearity.  To check this, we omitted URBAN from the model 
and controlled for urban location by splitting the sample.  For each annual cohort, we created one 
subsample that included only urban homes and a second subsample that included only suburban 
homes.  We then estimated Model 2 for each subsample.  Qualitatively, the results (omitted for 
the sake of brevity) were the same as those reported in Table 4—LEV is not significant in any of 
the four annual cohorts.    
While these results indicate that there is not a statistically significant relationship between 
the LEMs consortium’s index of location efficiency and the probability of default, it is still 
possible that one or more of the locational variables used to calculate this index are correlated 
with the probability of default.  Model 4 tests this hypothesis.  This model includes the four 
census tract-level locational variables used to calculate LEVs—households per residential acre 
(HH_DENS), pedestrian friendliness (PED_FACT), households per total acre (RAW_DENS), 
and transit access (ZONAL_TR)—along with 19 control variables.  We find that none of the 
locational variables are significant in any of the four annual cohorts.11 
 
                                                 
11 To be certain that this result is not affected by multicollinearity stemming from correlations among the locational 
regressors, we estimated four auxiliary models that included just one locational variable along with the control 
variables.  Qualitatively, the results (omitted for the sake of brevity) were the same as reported in Model 4—none of 
the locational variables was negatively and significantly correlated with default.  The same results were obtained 
when we controlled for urban location using the split sample discussed above. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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5.  Conclusion 
Our results indicate that in our sample of mortgage records, the measure of location 
efficiency used by LEMs advocates—the LEV—is not significantly correlated with a lower 
probability of default, all other things equal.  Moreover, neither are any of the components of this 
measure including density, access to mass transit, and pedestrian friendliness.  What accounts for 
these negative results?  One explanation is that while homeowners in location efficient areas may 
actually enjoy transportation costs savings, these savings are simply not large enough to affect 
their propensities to default.  Indeed, there are a number of reasons to believe that the estimates 
of transportation cost savings generated by the LEMs computer model—often hundreds of 
dollars per month—are overstated.12 A complimentary explanation is that homeowners rationally 
anticipate any transportation cost savings from location efficiency and allocate these saving to 
alternative uses, leaving their ability to repay housing debt not much improved.13   
Our findings probably come as no surprise to those who believe that mortgage lenders are 
reasonably well-informed profit maximizers.  A statistically significant negative relationship 
between location efficiency and mortgage default would imply that lenders have overlooked 
opportunities to increase their profits by conditioning mortgage contracts on an easily observable 
determinate of loan repayment.     
Since we find no demonstrable relationship between location efficiency and the 
probability of default, we would argue that making low-down payment loans available to 
borrowers in location efficient areas is tantamount to making such loans available to a random 
sample of borrowers and will have the same impact:  It will raise default rates.  This conclusion 
is subject to a number of caveats.  First, it is based on an indirect test of the proposition that 
LEMs will not raise default rates.  Second, this conclusion is based on a sample of mortgage 
records that is limited both geographically and temporally.  It is conceivable—although in our 
opinion highly doubtful—that the beneficial effects of location efficiency on mortgage 
                                                 
12 First, as discussed in the appendix, the algorithm used to calculate transportation cost savings from location 
efficiency assumes that borrowers purchasing homes in location efficient areas would otherwise live in particularly 
location inefficient areas, an arbitrary assumption that clearly biases cost savings estimates upwards.  Second, 
compared to alternative models (Schimek 1996), the econometric model used to calculate transportation costs 
(Holtzclaw 1994) assumes vehicle miles traveled are particularly responsive to household density. 
13 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this explanation. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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repayment were for some reason dampened in Chicago in the late 1980s and early 1990s.14  
Research in a second city would be useful to confirm the generalizability of our results.  (With 
the recent expansion of the LEMs program, it is now possible to replicate our analysis using data 
from Los Angeles, Portland, San Francisco and Seattle).  Also, in a number of years, it will be 
possible to examine the historical record of repayment on LEMs.   
Given our findings, should LEMs be dismissed as a viable policy?  Not necessarily.  If 
LEMs are effective in controlling sprawl or achieving other policy objectives, then their cost in 
terms of default losses would have to be weighed against their benefits, as well as against the 
costs of achieving these benefits by other means.  This paper has not focused on the possible 
benefits of LEMs so we are not in a position to speculate on these calculations.  Our main point 
is simply that just as policy makers recognize that low-down payment loan programs like those 
operated by the FHA and VA involve tradeoffs between higher default costs and specific policy 
objectives (for example, expanded home ownership), they should also recognize that LEMs will 
entail a quid pro quo.  Contrary to the claims of advocates, our findings suggest that LEMs are 
unlikely to be a costless anti-sprawl policy. 
                                                 
14 The fact that the mortgages in our sample were originated during a recession in which average default rates rose is 
not particularly germane to our analysis.  All the borrowers in our sample were subjected to the same 
macroeconomic conditions.  If it is true—as LEMs advocates claim—that location efficiency mitigates default risk, 
then in times of economic distress borrowers in location efficient areas should still have below-average default rates 
all other things equal, despite the fact that average default rates for all borrowers have risen. Resources for the Future  Blackman and Krupnick 
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Appendix:  Locational Variables 
A.  Sources of data 
HH_DENS1990 Census data and Chicago Metro. Planning Org. 
LEV LEMs  Coalition 
PED_FACTLEMs Coalition 
RAW_DENS 1990 Census data 
ZONAL_TRLEMs Coalition 
B.  Methodologies used by the LEMs coalition to derive PED_FACT,  ZONAL_TR 
and LEV15 
PED_FACT is calculated by Travel Analysis Zones (TAZ), which are aggregations of 
census tracts.  PED_FACT is the sum of three variables:  STREET_GRID, YEAR_BUILT and 
BONUSES.  The variables are derived from Census and Chicago Area Transportation Study 
(CATS) Committee data.   
STREET_GRID is simply the average block size in the TAZ.  It is equal to the number of 
census blocks divided by the number of developed hectares (including areas zoned as residential, 
commercial, and industrial).  The rationale for this variable is that smaller blocks are more 
pedestrian friendly. 
YEAR_BUILT is an index based on the median vintage of the building stock, 
information that is derived from the 1990 Census.  This variable purports to capture the safety of 
streets, the setback of buildings, and sidewalk weather protection.   The index is:  
 
median vintageindex 
1939 or earlier0.7   
1940-19420.6   
                                                 
15 This section is based on based on Center for Neighborhood Technologies (1998) and (1999) as well as multiple 
personal communications with John Holtzclaw of the Natural Resources Defense Council and Peter Hass of the 







1956 or newer. 0 
BONUSES is an ad hoc variable meant to give credit to areas that have implemented 
“traffic calming” policies like narrowing streets, widening sidewalks, and planting trees in 
median strips as well as areas that have built bike lanes.  The variable ranges from zero to one for 
traffic calming credits and from zero to 0.5 for bicycle friendliness. 
ZONAL_TR purports to capture accessibility to mass transit in a given census tract.  It 
approximates the average number of buses and train cars available to the population of a census 
tract each day.  For each type of mass transit, the methodology involves four steps.  For buses, 
first, a “buffer zone” is drawn around each bus stop in the area.  Because of the grid layout of 
streets in Chicago, the buffer zone is shaped like a diamond with the distance from the center of 
the diamond to each point being one-quarter mile.  The number of daily buses at each stop is 
determined from Chicago Transportation Authority route schedules.  One bus arriving at one 
stop is counted as two buses: one inbound and one outbound.  One bus that stops at two stops 
within the buffer zone is counted as four buses.  Second, the number of buses per stop per day is 
multiplied by the population in the buffer zone to get the number of people served by each bus.  
Third, population served is attributed to census tracts as follows.  If a buffer zone lies within a 
census tract, 100 percent of the population served in that buffer zone are assigned to the census 
tract.  If a only part of a buffer zone lies within the census tract, the census tract is assigned a 
fraction of the population served in the buffer zone.  This fraction is the percentage of the buffer 
zone that lies within the census tract.  The process is identical for trains, except that the buffer 
zone is one half mile.  Finally, the number of people served by each bus or rail car in each census 
tract is normalized by the number of people in each census tract.   
LEVs are calculated by using a three step methodology.  First, the LEMs coalition’s 
econometrically estimated model is used to predict both vehicle miles traveled (VMTs) and 
number of autos owned per residence (VEH/HH).  That model is,  
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Note that two of these independent variables—household income and number of persons 
in the household—are specific to the loan applicant while the remaining four independent 
variables relate to the census tract in which the home is located.  (For our regressions we 
constructed the variable HH_SIZE from FHA data using the formula, HH_SIZE = Borrower + 
Coborrower [if any] + number of dependents [if any]).  Second, given econometrically estimated 
VMTs and auto ownership, auto expenses are calculated using Federal Highway Administration 
figures on the costs of owning and operating automobiles (Federal Highway Administration, 
1992).   
 
  Auto  expenses = (VMT/HH*$0.127 per mile) + (VEH/HH*$2,207 per auto per year)   
Costs are inflated to 1998 dollars using the consumer price index.  Finally, automobile 
expenses for the borrower are subtracted from “base case” expenses, the difference being the 
LEV.  The base case is meant to represent auto expenses for a household of similar size and 
wealth in a location inefficient census tract, that is, one with relatively low density, transit 
access, and pedestrian friendliness.  It is constructed as follows.  Census tracts are grouped into 
quartiles for the entire Chicago region based on household densities per residential acre.  The 
average household density in the lowest quartile is very close to one household per residential 
acre.  Using this density and the “low” values for zonal transit access and pedestrian factor a 
“base cost” is calculated for each household size and household income.  The difference between 
the base case auto costs and the econometrically estimated auto costs is the LEV.  The LEV will 
be negative if the census tract in question is less location efficient that the base case.   
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